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CHAPTER I
HUSSERL’S NEW PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME
CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BERNAU MANUSCRIPTS
Rudolf Bernet
Abstract. This paper has no other ambition than to provide a short historical
and systematic overview of the analysis of time-consciousness developed in the
Bernau manuscripts. More specifically, it investigates where these manuscripts
make a significant progress when dealing with problems which had remained
unsolved in the earlier texts of Hua X, and where they pave the way for to the later
C-manuscripts. Four main areas of renewal are signaled out: (1) a better account
of transcendental constitution and how it applies to the meaning of immanent
temporal objects, but not to the self-awareness of the temporal flux of conscious-
ness; (2) the renewal of the meaning of transcendental constitution through a
“genetic” analysis of the emergence of all acts of intentional consciousness; (3)
a better account of the consciousness of a present now in terms of a process
of fulfillment in which retentions and protentions are interwoven; (4) a fresh
interest in specifically noematic temporal characteristics and their contribution
to a phenomenological ontology, especially with regard to individuation. These
new insights have decisive consequences for the treatment of all the well-known
technical issues in Husserl’s phenomenology of time: the use of the schema “appre-
hension – apprehension-content” for the intentional consciousness of (different
sorts of ) temporal objects; the infinite regress arising from the search for an abso-
lute foundation of time-consciousness; the distinction between a passively (and
unconsciously?) lived-through temporal stream and the modification it undergoes
when it becomes an object of reflection. Emphasizing where progress has been
made, the paper, however, also points to the remaining, and possibly structural,
“Aporien” that Husserl himself admits of in his Bernau manuscripts.
I.
Despite their considerable size, Husserl’s so-called “Bernau Manuscripts”
were written over a relatively brief span of time. Husserl stayed in Bernau
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in both August and September 1917 as well as February andMarch 1918.
The general theme of the texts, which were written in those less than five
months or so, was consistently paraphrased by Husserl with the heading
“Time and Individuation.” The motivation for this renewed preoccupa-
tion with the problem of time shortly after his relocation to Freiburg was
influenced by Edith Stein’s project of editing the earlier time analyses.
A first edit of these earlier manuscripts, which consisted of, above all,
the lectures of 1904/1905, but also included some texts from the follow-
ing years until 1911, was jointly revised by Husserl and Stein during her
presence in Bernau in the summer of 1917. But, as usual with Husserl,
this revision soon led to new investigations, which in turn demanded
all of Husserl’s attention. Much to the dismay of Stein, Husserl now had
very little time and interest remaining for the engagement with the earlier
time manuscripts, and a couple of months later and after several similar
experiences, she gave notice to quit her assistantship with Husserl.
For exactly how long Husserl regarded the manuscripts developed in
Bernau as merely a complement and continuation of his earlier texts on
the consciousness of internal time cannot be reconstructed with certainty.
It is certain, however, that Husserl was conscious of the new direction that
his engagement with the problem of time had taken in Bernau. No later
than his second stay in Bernau at the beginning of 1918, Husserl spoke
quite frequently of a new “great work,” the contents of which he char-
acterized in a letter to Martin Heidegger on March 28, 1918, as follows:
“Time and individuation, a renewal of a rational metaphysics based on
principles”.1 A few days later, he described his project even more clearly in
a letter to Roman Ingarden on April 5: “For I am working not on a mere
phenomenology of time – which cannot be treated separately and purely
for itself – but on the colossal problem of individuation, of the constitu-
tion of individual (thus “factual”) being in general, and that according to
its essentially basic formations.”2
Then, eight solid years later, in 1926, Husserl contacted Heidegger
with a request to prepare his time manuscripts for publication in the
Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. In doing so he
probably hoped at first that Heidegger would consider not only the earlier
texts, but also the Bernau Manuscripts. However, because Heidegger did
not want to get involved in editing stenographic research manuscripts,
Husserl only handed over Stein’s edited version of the earlier texts. With
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that, the separation of the Bernau Manuscripts from the corpus of the
earlier analyses of time was also physically accomplished. When, one
year later, in September 1927, Husserl tried to get Ingarden involved
in the publication of his time analyses, the project concerned exclu-
sively the texts from Bernau. After this attempt also failed, Husserl finally
delivered, probably a full year later near the end of 1928, the material
of the Bernau Manuscripts to his assistant Eugen Fink. Meanwhile, in
April of the same year, Heidegger had published Stein’s edition of the
earlier texts making only small changes and adding an “Introductory
Remark,” in which he refers to a “later publication” of the “continuing
studies of time-consciousness in connection with the problem of indi-
viduation, especially those undertaken since 1917.”3 In the manuscripts
from Bernau, compiled by Husserl and handed over to Fink, the problem
of individuation, however, is not the major topic. It cannot be said with
any great certainty for which reasons and with respect to which publi-
cation plan Husserl left out in large part those texts on the problem of
individuation, which he had written during his second stay in Bernau.
However, these more ontologically oriented time-analyses from Bernau,
which centered on the problem of the individuation of different kinds
of objectivities, were in fact discovered in Husserl’s Nachlass, and some
of them were incorporated, together with the manuscripts entrusted to
Fink, into the Husserliana volume of the Bernau texts which was edited
by Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar.4
Eugen Fink occupied himself with the Bernau time-manuscripts again
and again in the years from 1929 to 1937. Husserl tried to assist the
faltering advance of the editing work by granting more and more libe-
rty to his assistant concerning the use of his texts. There was soon talk
of a publication that would be supplemented by Fink’s own texts and
appear under both names. In fact, both Husserl and Fink were intensely
preoccupied with the problem of time in the beginning of the thirties,
in conversation with each other and in independently producing new
texts. Though it was never abandoned, the effort to publish the Bernau
Manuscripts receded into the background. Husserl composed numerous
manuscripts dealing with the relationship of time-consciousness to hyletic
pre-givenness and egoic performances, to sleep, death, and waking, to
intersubjectivity and trans-generative historicity, etc. His preoccupation
with time thus took a decisive turn in these texts, best known as “The
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C-Manuscripts.”5 Despite the fact that Husserl himself considered these
last time-manuscripts as a continuation of the Bernau investigations,
it did not lead him to think that both groups of manuscripts should
be blended into a single publication. Not only the considerable size
of each group, but also their systematically differing points of depar-
ture suggested that Husserl’s middle and late texts on the problem of
time should be published separately. Therefore, the publication of the
Bernau Manuscripts and the C-Manuscripts as two different volumes in
Husserliana edition complies with Husserl’s own wishes.
Additionally Fink’s own work on the time-problem did not remain
fruitless. “Time and Temporalization,” the treatise which was based on
the Bernau Manuscripts and to be jointly published by Husserl and
Fink, was transformed with Husserl’s consent (though he could not hide
his disappointment) into a new book on time with Fink as the sole
author. However, Fink never published any such text. According to his
own account, he willfully destroyed the manuscript of his own book. In
1969, he handed over Husserl’s original Bernau Manuscripts, which were
entrusted to him at the end of 1928, to the Husserl Archives in Leuven,
where they were filed in the Nachlass as the “L-Group.” They presently
form the core of the Volume XXXIII of the Husserliana edition which
includes a large selection from all the manuscripts written in Bernau and
presents them in a systematic order.
II.
If, following this short sketch of the history of the genesis of the
Bernau time-manuscripts, we now turn to their systematic content, it
seems appropriate that we situate it in the context of both the earlier
manuscripts edited in Volume X ofHusserliana and the later time-analyses
of the C-Manuscripts edited in Volume VIII of Husserliana-Materialien.
Husserl’s earlier texts on the phenomenology of time-consciousness
take their point of departure from the description of the perception of
temporal objects (a constant tone) or time-objects (the duration of the
tone). In his engagement (which is completely missing in the Bernau
Manuscripts) with the writings of Brentano and Meinong, and also with
James, Stumpf, Stern, etc., Husserl’s conviction that the perception of an
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enduring object does indeed normally occur in an enduring act of percep-
tion, but that the duration of perception alone does not yet explain how
the perception of an objective duration is possible, ripened. As with his
predecessors, Husserl’s analysis of the perception of a temporal duration
came to a head with the question of whether and how a present act is
able to perceive a temporal extension which exceeds the actual present. In
addition Husserl’s insight that a duration can be presently grasped only
when the present time-object is simultaneously grasped with its prece-
ding and now past givenness, still owed much to his discussions of views
defended by his contemporaries.
For this present grasping of a past which is intimately connected with
the present grasping of a present, Husserl first used the name “Primary
Memory,” but soon after he coined the term “Retention.” With regard
to content, he differed in some significant ways from Brentano and
Meinong, in that he understood this retention neither as an act (in the
mode of phantasy) of representation (Brentano), nor as a categorial act
of a subsequent synthesis (Meinong), but instead as a modality of the
perception itself. Thus Husserl wanted, on one hand, to cling to the
distinction between the present (primary-impressional) grasping of the
present tone and the present (retentional) grasping of the past tone, but
on the other hand, he wanted both graspings to still be understood as
non-independent moments of the same act of present perception. This
was and remained Husserl’s fundamental intuition, the analytically elabo-
rated determination of which admittedly still occupied him for several
years after a first failed attempt in the Time Lectures of 1904/1905. The
investigation into the essence of the present grasping of a futural tone,
which Husserl called “Protention,” remained a minor point. The topic of
protention, and especially its interlacing with retention, first received the
attention it deserves in the Bernau Manuscripts.
Husserl’s preoccupation with the essence of intuitive phantasy and
its distinction from the acts of recollection, which spanned years and
even extended into his time at Bernau, also played an essential role
in the advance of his determination of the essence of retention. From
it resulted the insight that the retentional consciousness, in contrast
to phantasy and recollection, is indeed not an act of representation
[Vergegenwärtigung], but nevertheless is a modified consciousness of a
(former) original present. The retentional consciousness of the past is
6 rudolf bernet
therefore neither a reproductive representation of the past like recollec-
tion, nor a simple making-present [Gegenwärtigung] of the present like
the original perception, but is the modified perception of a past. It was
not easy for Husserl to precisely determine the essence of this perception
of the past in the framework of his doctrine of intentional consciousness,
and the related difficulties also worried him in the Bernau Manuscripts
again and again. Problems resulted especially from the application of the
schema of the intentional apprehension of a sense-datum, which was
borrowed from the phenomenological determination of the external per-
ception of spatial objects, to time-consciousness and therefore also to the
retentional perception-consciousness. In reference to the latter, one of the
questions that arises concerns how a present apprehension of a similarly
present sensation should succeed in retentionally perceiving a present that
belongs to the past.
Husserl’s various attempts to solve this puzzle ultimately led him again
and again to the same point, namely to the givenness of the sense-datum
supposedly implicated in retentional consciousness. It soon became obvi-
ous that the modification, which characterizes the present retentional
consciousness of a past present, must concern not only the apprehen-
sion but necessarily also the apprehended sense-datum. Otherwise, it
is impossible to understand why a sensation can allow for a perceptual
apprehension of something present in one case and, in the other case,
allow for a retentional apprehension of something past. The “phantasma,”
that is, the modified sense-datum of an apprehension in the mode of
a phantasy, volunteered itself as a model for the modified content that
underlies retentional apprehension. However, a more thorough investiga-
tion of phantasy-consciousness proved that this model contains its own
peculiar puzzle, one which precisely concerns the essence, that is, the
mode of givenness, of this phantasma.
The parallel investigations of retention and phantasy, which conti-
nued through the Bernau Manuscripts, soon led to the insight that the
difficulties connected with the phenomenological determination of the
phantasma are fundamentally the same as those which concern the deter-
mination of the modified sense-datum in retentional consciousness. Thus
identifying the sense-datum motivating a retentional apprehension with
a phantasma helped no further, and it simultaneously threatened to blur
the distinction between the presenting retention and the representing
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phantasy. Only when one can cling, on the one hand, to the dif-
ferentiation between the phantasmal and retentional modifications of
the contents of apprehension, and also, on the other hand, account
for the circumstance that both sense-data concern a modified, senso-
rial consciousness, of which the general essence must still be clarified,
can the phenomenological analyses of retention and phantasy stimulate
each other. On closer inspection, the task concerns not only retention
and phantasy, but also the consciousness of an unmodified sense-datum
that underlies a perceptual apprehension. Husserl called the givenness
of one such unmodified, i.e. originarily present sensation, “primary
impression [Urimpression]” in the early texts and “primary presentation
[Urpräsentation]” in the later Bernau manuscripts.
The first decisive step towards to a clarification of the essence of modi-
fied or unmodified givenness of the sensorial content which underlies
an intentional apprehension is already to be found in Husserl’s earlier
texts on time-consciousness, and the insights acquired in them are never
called into question in the Bernau Manuscripts. Of whatever kind the
intentional apprehension of the sense-datum implicit in retention and
phantasy (and also already in perception) may be, that is, if it is a question
of a perceptual, retentional, or phantasmal apprehension, it is certain, in
any case, that the apprehended sense-datum is itself given; and therefore
there must be a modified or unmodified consciousness of it. Thus in the
end, the difference between a present sensation and a retentionally given
sensation depends on the different consciousness of these sensations.
Husserl named this inner consciousness of the sensation “absolute con-
sciousness” in the earlier texts and then in the Bernau Manuscripts the
“originary process [Urprozess]” or “originary stream [Urstrom].” The sen-
sations were called “immanent time-objects” in the early texts and as
such they were distinguished from the transcendent objects belonging
to objective time, like, for instance, the tone of a violin. The Bernau
Manuscripts more simply called these immanent time-objects tempo-
ral “events [Ereignisse]” and the inner consciousness of them “lived-
experience [Erlebnis].” This alteration in terminology is already a first
indication that it was no longer self-evident for Husserl in Bernau that
(modified and unmodified) sensations are given in the originary pro-
cess as objects and that the originary process itself had the form of an
objectifying intentional consciousness.
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The introduction of the “absolute” consciousness in the earlier texts
involved many problems, which still bothered Husserl in Bernau. A first
difficulty arose with the exact determination of the nature of this “abso-
lute” consciousness in its relationship to the “immanent time-objects.”
In the manuscripts from the Nachlass published in Hua X one can
trace how Husserl finally arrived at a two-fold insight on this matter.
First, it soon became clear to him that the so-called “absolute” con-
sciousness of the sense-data was a kind of intentional consciousness; that
is, the sense-data could not belong to the “absolute” consciousness as
“reelle” constituents. Otherwise the difference between a modified and
an unmodified, i.e., between a retentional and a primary-impressional
consciousness of a sensation, would have become unintelligible. Husserl’s
second new insight, resulting from the introduction of the transcendental-
phenomenological reduction, consisted in the new characterization of the
relationship between “absolute” consciousness and sense-data as a rela-
tion of constitution. Similarly as a transcendent object is constituted in
the apprehension of a sense-datum, the sensation is also constituted in
the “absolute” consciousness as a (present, past, or futural) immanent
time-object.
Then, in the Bernau Manuscripts, both these insights were again
subjected to thorough examination, and admittedly, it seems without
conclusive results. In many of these Bernau texts Husserl began to doubt
again whether the relationship between the “originary process” and tem-
poral “events” is really a matter of transcendental constitution, and
whether this “originary process” and these “events” really belong to two
different levels of consciousness. This doubt had its source above all in the
question of whether the “events” in the “originary process” really come to
prominence and grasping as immanent objects. With this, the first insight
was also called into question again, namely the designation of the orig-
inary process as a kind of intentional consciousness. Incidentally, these
doubts and questions still bothered Husserl in the late texts on time of
the C-Group. On the one hand, this seems to confirm the impression
that no final characterization of the connection between the “originary
process” and temporal “events” is advanced in the Bernau Manuscripts.
On the other hand, however, it is unmistakable that those later texts of
the C-Group develop a doctrine that, along with other doctrines, can
already be found in the Bernau Manuscripts.
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Put succinctly, this doctrine consists in the attempt of a radical sepa-
ration between egoic and pre-egoic, i.e. hyletic, time-processes. The
indepth investigation of the difference between an egoic and actively
performed temporalization, on the one hand, and an anonymous and pas-
sively occurring, material or hyletic temporalization, on the other, leads
Husserl in the C-Manuscripts to deny that this pre-egoic flowing stream
can be ascribed any original constitutive performance. According to this
view, one can only speak of a constitution of temporal objects when there
is an active involvement of the transcendental ego. In order to acquire
a constitutive signification, the pre-intentional hyletic originary stream
thus needs to undergo a thorough modification which consists in a sub-
sequent performance of an egoic act of reflection on it. This new model
of the originary process admittedly has its ground not only in the sepa-
ration between active and passive forms of consciousness, but also in the
problem of the infinite regress, which lurks behind Husserl’s phenomeno-
logy of time-consciousness, both in the early texts as well as in the Bernau
Manuscripts and in the later time-manuscripts of the C-Group.
It can already be gathered from the early texts published in Hua X that
there are, in fact, different forms of such an infinite regress. A first form
arises from the fact that each newly emerging “primary impression,” or
each new “primary presentation,” modifies the mode in which the former
primary impression is given, transforming it into a retention of a past
primary impression. A third new primary impression then modifies not
only the previous (second) primary impression, but equally the retention
of the first primary impression which is connected with it. This first pri-
mary impression is therefore now given under the form of a modification
of a modification. With the fourth new primary impression, the given-
ness of every single past primary impression is modified once more, and
the givenness of the first primary impression now has the mode of the
modification of a modification of a modification. As long as the originary
process remains lively, i.e. as long as new primary impressions surface
in consciousness, this complicated process of a continuous and multidi-
mensional modification of the modification of the givenness of each past
primary impression carries on, potentially ad infinitum. Thus, in the lat-
ter case, the retentional grasping of the initial primary impression would
be tied to a running-through of an infinite series of modifications nested
into one another.6
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This first regressus ad infinitum is comparatively harmless because it
does not call into question the possibility of grasping a first primary
impression. However, the Bernau Manuscripts reveal that it became more
andmore doubtful for Husserl whether such a process of an infinite modi-
fication of a retentional past really represents a phenomenologically veri-
fied finding. In the course of his new description of time-consciousness
in the framework of a genetic phenomenology, Husserl increasingly
concerned himself with the consequences the constantly (with each rei-
teration of retentional modification) growing distancing from the present
has for the retentional givenness of the past. He described how the
primary presentations belonging to a far-distant past fuse together and
thereby not only lose their clear distinction from one another, but also
their affective allure on the present ego. The Bernau Manuscripts from
1918 dedicate detailed investigations to this phenomenon, which is dis-
tinguished from retention and named “fading-away [Abklang].” In the
absence of an active turning-towards and grasping on the part of the ego,
the retentions directed at a distant past soon die off, and with that the
process of their continual modification also potentially comes to a stand-
still. Dead retentions can become newly awakened and rise up again, but
this does not immediately do away with their character of indistinctness
or haziness.
The second form of an infinite regress concerns the awareness of the
“absolute consciousness” or of the “originary process.” We have seen
that Husserl characterizes the intentional consciousness of a transcendent
time-object as an intentional apprehension of a pre-intentional sense-
datum. This sense-datum is then, in its turn, experienced by a deeper
consciousness, namely by the “absolute consciousness” or “originary pro-
cess.” The exact determination of this originary process still bothered
Husserl very much in the Bernau Manuscripts. Time and again the
question surfaced as to whether the so-called “absolute” consciousness
should, indeed, be understood as an independent level of consciousness,
whether it really concerns an intentional and transcendentally constitu-
tive consciousness, and whether the intentionality of this consciousness
still has the form of an intentional apprehension of a pre-intentional
apprehension-content. The further question then also arises, both in the
earlier texts and in the Bernau Manuscripts, as to the nature of the con-
sciousness that makes us aware of the flow of this “absolute consciousness”
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or of this “originary process.” If the latter consciousness still requires a
further consciousness for which it is given, then it loses not only its “abso-
lute” character as an “originary process,” but one also falls prey to a form
of infinite regress, which would precipitate the whole edifice of the levels
of consciousness resting on each other into an abyss.
The risk of such an infinite regress, which is connected with the con-
sciousness of an “absolute” consciousness, was not only formulated with
sufficient clarity already in Husserl’s early texts, but Husserl also suc-
ceeded in finding an attractive solution to the difficulty. The core of this
solution lies in the supposition that the “absolute” consciousness must
necessarily and simultaneously be a consciousness of the givenness of
immanent time-objects and a consciousness of its own flow. This solu-
tion did not remain a mere hypothesis but on the contrary, Husserl tried
to demonstrate in a painstaking analysis of retentional consciousness two
points: first, due to the continuous change of the time-perspective (or
“time-adumbration”), the unity of an immanent time-object, with its
respective time-position, comes to prominence in the continuum of the
retentional modifications, and second, a consciousness of the flow of the
continuously self-modifying retentional consciousness itself also arises by
means of the “nesting [Verschachtelung]” of each retention with all the
other retentions. Therefore, the flow of the “absolute” retentional con-
sciousness entails a double intentionality, of which one is directed to
immanent time-objects and the other has the form of a self-reference, i.e.
of a self-awareness of the flow. Husserl termed the former direction of the
retentional intentionality “transverse-intentionality [Querintentionalität]”
and the latter “longitudinal intentionality [Längsintentionalität].” Finally,
Husserl also specifically stressed that both these intentional directions in
the course of the flow of the continuous retentional modifications belong
to one selfsame process and therefore are “inseparably” connected with
one another.7
This attempt at overcoming the danger of the infinite regress related to
the consciousness of the “originary process” was taken up again and more
widely developed in the Bernau Manuscripts. In accordance with the ear-
lier texts, a clear distinction between the retention of an immanent object
and the retention of the originary process is made. However, Husserl does
make a significant advance by now paying more attention to protentional
consciousness. This newly awakened and long overdue interest in the
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contribution of protention not only to a consciousness of the “originary
process,” but also to the consciousness of novelty (which is preoccupying
Husserl with increasing intensity), is reflected in the new time diagrams
one finds in the Bernau Manuscripts. Specifically the precise investigation
of the intertwining of retentional and protentional continua of modifica-
tions resulted in significant new insights. Husserl was no longer satisfied
with the suggestion that each primary presentation is embedded in a bilat-
eral horizon of retentional and protentional phenomena, but instead he
analyzed, often in microscopic detail, the role of protentions within the
continuum of the retentional modification and the influence of retentions
on the determination of the contents of the protentions.
This new discovery of the function of both protention within retention
and retention within protention resulted from a more dynamic analysis
of time-consciousness that was linked with the development of a genetic
phenomenology. This new perspective is made apparent by the fact that,
for example, “primary presentation” (or the former “primary impression”)
is now no longer understood as the original core or “source-point” of
time-consciousness, but instead as a mere limit point in which the con-
tinua of retentional and protentional modifications intersect. In such a
genetic analysis, the originary process shows itself to be more than a
mere mechanical process of continuous modification resulting from the
pushing-back of the present into the past. On the contrary, this originary
process, as the life-process of consciousness, is governed by passive ten-
dencies and anticipations, by forms of the increasing and weakening of
the intuitive fullness of different phenomena, by the lived-experiences of
an incessant “fulfillment [Erfüllung]” and “emptying [Entfüllung].”
For the understanding of the phenomenon of an inner awareness of the
originary process these new investigations led Husserl to no longer con-
sider the emergence of such a self-consciousness to be exclusively a matter
of retention, i.e. of a retentional “longitudinal intentionality.” According
to the Bernau Manuscripts, this self-consciousness of the originary pro-
cess rather arises from the experience of a present intuitive fulfillment,
i.e. by virtue of the consciousness of the continuous transition of reten-
tional protentions to their intuitive realization. In this dynamic, flowing
process of fulfillment, the flow of consciousness itself comes to a present
appearance through the awareness of the fact that what is presently given
is the same as what one had already anticipated in the past as something
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futural. The present lived-experience of a temporal fulfillment has there-
fore in reality the form of a conscious awareness of a becoming-present
of a past anticipation. Unlike the earlier texts, which ascribe the self-
awareness of the originary stream of consciousness to a merely subsequent
retentional form of consciousness, the Bernau Manuscripts emphasize
the possibility of a self-consciousness essentially anchored in the flowing
present.
It must be admitted, however, that this new doctrine concerning the
consciousness of the originary process does not obtain throughout all
the Bernau texts and that it was again the threat of an infinite regress
that made Husserl consider alternative, or rather, competing concep-
tions. The new model of an originary self-awareness of the temporal flow
of consciousness still takes for granted that the originary process is an
independent level of intentional consciousness, responsible for the con-
stitution of immanent time-objects such as sense-data and even the acts
of their intentional apprehension. We have already mentioned that this
understanding of the originary process is seriously called into question
in several of the Bernau texts. At the end of his detailed discussion of the
difference between an implicit perception and the givenness of immanent
time-objectivities in the originary stream, Husserl comes to the conclu-
sion that the hypothesis of an originary process that would necessarily
remain “unconscious” cannot be considered as a credible alternative to
his new account of the self-awareness of the originary process. However,
even if he does not allow there to be any such unconscious originary
process, the questions still remain regarding the nature of an ungrasped
originary process and whether such a process can be ascribed a transcen-
dentally constitutive performance. But if the latter is not the case and
if a subsequent egoic grasping, thus an act of reflection, is required in
order to bestow a constitutive performance on the originary process, then
both its independence and intentional character become questionable.
Eventually, nothing would be left of an original self-consciousness of the
originary process. Alternative determinations of the originary process are
possible but again face all the difficulties connected with the possibility of
the awareness of the originary process and the threat of an infinite regress.
In the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl’s work on these matters cleared
at least two different paths. A first path leads him again into the vicin-
ity of Brentano’s well-known model of inner consciousness, for which he
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had, despite severe criticism, already shown much sympathy in his ear-
lier texts. According to this path, the so-called “originary process” would
in the end be nothing other than an accompanying phenomenon of the
egoic performance of intentional acts in which transcendent time-objects
are constituted. Instead of intentionally intending these acts as immanent
time-objects, the originary process would be nothing more than an inner,
non-independent and implicit, awareness of the subjective performance
of these acts. The primary process would thus be a form of intentional
consciousness in which, however, no temporal “objects” are intended.
Only a subsequent act of reflection would turn the performance of the
act into an intentional object. It seems, however, that what remains unde-
cided in the Bernau Manuscripts are the questions of whether and how,
within this intentional act of reflection on the original act-performance,
the difference between the consciousness of the act and the consciousness
of the (originary) consciousness of the act becomes apparent. A second
path, taken by Husserl in Bernau, or at least discussed in detail, consists
similarly in a return to an earlier doctrine. It concerns nothing other than
the use of the “apprehension – apprehension-content” schema not only
for the determination of how the originary process constitutes immanent
time-objects, but also for how the originary process itself, and the pri-
mary presentations, retentions and protentions which animate its flow
should be understood. However, with this Husserl once more runs the
risk of the infinite regress, and it is a characteristic of the relevant Bernau
Manuscripts that the matters of applying the schema “apprehension –
apprehension-content” to time-consciousness and of exorcising the risk
of the infinite regress go mostly hand in hand.
Nevertheless, the difficulty of the infinite regress, which emerges anew
again and again within the Bernau Manuscripts, cannot exclusively, and
without further ado, be blamed on one or the other, more or less convin-
cing model of the originary process. It presumably concerns a much more
fundamental problem involving the system of Husserl’s basic approach to
a phenomenology of time altogether. Perhaps it is simply the case that
there can be no account of the origin of time which does not already
presuppose time. This sort of consideration is also not completely foreign
to the Bernau Manuscripts, and it is met with, at least rudimentarily, in
Husserl’s treatment of the phenomenon of “novelty” and especially the
question of the possibility of a “first” primary presentation.
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III.
Our exposition of the systematically embedded place of the Bernau
Manuscripts in the problematic horizon and unresolved difficulties of
the earlier texts on time-consciousness must not give the impression,
however, that these texts would be little more than a mere supplement
to Hua X. After all, the years between the last early texts on time-
consciousness and the first Bernau Manuscripts, viz., between 1911 and
1917, saw the publication of the first book of Ideas.8 This work, as is well-
known, contains not only a systematic portrayal of the method of the
phenomenological reduction and the transcendental idealism connected
with it, but also a detailed investigation of the intentional consciousness
from the point of view of the noetic-noematic correlation. It also intro-
duces the pure ego, which the Logical Investigations still considered to be
phenomenologically undetectable. All these new findings found their way
into in the Bernau time-manuscripts.
Though Husserl was compelled quite frequently, especially in the treat-
ment of the constitutive function of time-consciousness, to reflect on the
essence of the phenomenological reduction and transcendental idealism,
the discussion of the constitution of objective time is given conspicuously
less attention than the analysis of the constitution of immanent time-
objects by the originary process. The Bernau Manuscripts also develop,
for the first time, a description of time-consciousness in specifically noe-
matic terms. Far from contenting himself with some general remark about
the correlation between the forms of noetic intending of time-objects and
the time-modalities of the noematic sense corresponding to them, Husserl
dedicated detailed and thorough investigations to the specific nature of
these noematic time-modalities and their modifications. This led him fur-
ther, through his engagement with the question concerning the temporal
individuation of different sorts of intentional objects, to the previously
mentioned ontological turn in his phenomenology of time. In this con-
text, the Bernau Manuscripts investigate questions such as whether the
modes of temporal givenness of an intentional object belong to its noe-
matic sense or not, and whether, in this respect, objects of experience
differ from the objects of phantasy and from the ideal objects. Finally,
the Bernau texts also take up the question concerning the relationship of
time-consciousness to the pure ego, which, after the publication of Ideas,
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could no longer be avoided. The relevant investigations revolve particu-
larly around the question of an egoic temporalization of events and the
becoming-temporal of the pure ego itself, and also around the relation
between the hyletic temporality of the originary stream and the temporal
lived-experiences accomplished or undergone by an active or passive ego.
However, the inclusion of the (still “static”) transcendental phe-
nomenology of Ideas is not the most decisive advance the Bernau
Manuscripts make beyond the earlier time-texts; it is rather the newly
introduced and consistently developed transition to a “genetic” phe-
nomenology. Thus, the breakthrough to this genetic phenomenology
did not first happen, as is generally assumed, in the lectures on
“Transcendental Logic” of the winter semester of 1920–1921,9 but is
already in full force in the Bernau time-manuscripts of 1917–1918. This
also explains why the reader of the texts from Bernau quite often feels,
especially with the treatment of the problem of recollection, reminded
of the better known description in the Analyses of Passive Synthesis.
Needless to say, it is no coincidence that Husserl’s new genetic phe-
nomenology first emerged from his reflections dedicated to the essence
of time-consciousness.
In his genetic time-analysis Husserl no longer takes it for granted
that the intentionality at work in time-consciousness is an egoic act-
intentionality with an objective correlate, like a typical static examination
of the correlation would have it. Though such act-intentionality plays
an important role in time-consciousness and in its constitutive function,
Husserl is now more interested in its arising from pre-intentional tenden-
cies, inclinations, and inhibitions, which characterize the intentionality
of a passively flowing originary process. Furthermore, this originary pro-
cess, as a life-process, is not simply an automatic process; it has a goal and
the tendency to draw near to this goal. This determination of the origi-
nary process of life as striving toward intuitive givenness forces Husserl,
as already mentioned, to a new, dynamic reformulation of the process of
temporal fulfillment.
The passively experienced, hyletic originary process stands therefore
at the source of the egoic acts of turning-towards, perceiving and gras-
ping. However, it is not only the subject of the egoic performance that
is born from this originary stream, but also each present givenness. In
fact, the consciousness of the being-present of a givenness arises, as was
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indicated above, from the interplay between the retentional and proten-
tional intentionality of the passively experienced originary stream. With
this new insight, the privilege of the present as the most originary dimen-
sion of time-consciousness could not remain unquestioned by a genetic
phenomenology. If each present has a genesis of its emergence, and thus
is a present having-come-to-be, then one understands even better why
Husserl engages in such a detailed way with the question of whether there
can be something like a first primary presentation.
The attentive investigation of the intertwinement of passive and active,
anonymous and egoic, intentional performances in time-consciousness
finally lead Husserl in Bernau to the discovery of a secondary form of
passivity, which characterizes the acts of the ego which have become mere
habits. As one would expect, it is above all in the framework of the new
genetic analysis of recollection that the Bernau Manuscripts deal with
these habitually performed achievements of time-consciousness. Their
analysis concerns, in particular, the difference between acts of remem-
bering that are habitually performed and serve a practical aim and acts of
remembering that are actively performed and serve the theoretical aim of
an ideal exactitude.
Even more than the analysis of recollection, the treatment of the prob-
lem of temporal individuation shows that, as the already quoted letter
from Husserl to Ingarden has it: “phenomenology of time [. . .] can-
not be treated separately and purely for itself [sich nicht rein für sich
ablösen lässt].” If the task of this phenomenology is to account for the
constitution of the temporal determinations of objects in transcendental
consciousness, then it must also pay attention to the ontological nature
of the temporal modalities of these objects. Modes of time are, according
to Husserl’s own formulation, modes of being or existence. However,
not only the present-being, past-being or futural-being are constituted
in time-consciousness, but also, more generally, the individuality of the
being of all (empirical) objects. The individuality of an object of experi-
ence ultimately always depends on its temporal givenness and especially
on its “first” and thus “unique [einmalig]” present givenness. However,
Husserl soon reflected on the problem concerning the possible or impos-
sible individuation of ideal objects. It belongs to the nature of such ideal
objects that they can “always” be apprehended and that their meaning
involves no necessary reference to a privileged first or unique form of
18 rudolf bernet
givenness. Does this mean that only empirically real objects have an essen-
tial reference to time and to a temporal individuation? But then how
do we account for the temporality and individuation of the objects of a
phantasy? If phantasy-objects, in their mode of being, occupy an inter-
mediate position between empirically individual and ideal objects, then
the examination of their temporality will also evince new insights in the
difference between the (necessary) individuation of empirical objects and
the (contingent) individuation of ideal objects, and more generally, into
the difference between “facts” and “essences.”
This explains why Husserl returns time and again to the phenomeno-
logical analysis of phantasy-time in those Bernau Manuscripts which
have an ontological orientation.10 It is easy to realize that the individ-
uation of a general essence must not be confused with its instantiation
in empirical examples, but Husserl is not satisfied with this purely
negative insight. He tries, therefore, to arrive at a positive characteri-
zation of the sort of individuation that applies to ideal objects and he
does so by examining how phantasy-objects become individual entities
through their subjective givenness in phantasy-acts as well as by their
inclusion in phantasy-worlds. The investigation of the subjective given-
ness of ideal objects, as well as of their inclusion in possible logical
“worlds,” leads then to results which are not only relevant for Husserl’s
project of a “rational metaphysics,” but may also be of interest for today’s
logicians.
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